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NOTES
Constitutional Law: A Price Tag on Expression: The
Constitutional Infirmities of Oklahoma's Ballot
Measure Contribution Limitations
This is true liberty, when free-born men,
Having to advise the public, may speak free,
Which he who can and will, deserves high praise;
Who neither can nor will, may hold his peace;
What can be juster in a State than this?
Euripides, The Supplicants
Introduction: Campaign Phobia
The shock of the Watergate scandal thrust America into a new era of political
philosophy. Because citizens could no longer lodge a naive faith in the
democratic process, they demanded knowledge of the use of funds by political
endorsing committees.' As an unfortunate result of the zealous pursuit of
campaign reforms, legislative limitations were placed upon the amount indivi-
duals could contribute to public ballot measures. The enactment of such laws
has raised serious first amendment reservations. The United States Supreme
Court has recently determined that the enforcement of these laws impermissibly
infringes on the freedoms of speech and association. This note will analyze
the Court's decisions in terms of Oklahoma's election code. If the Oklahoma
statutes in this area are unconstitutional, they should be repealed or significant-
ly amended.
Oklahoma joined the national crusade against election corruption in 1974
by adopting the Campaign Contributions and Expenditures Act, an omnibus
piece of legislation that placed stringent controls on state election procedures.2
To date, it has been interpreted only by two Attorney General Opinions.'
Even though no Oklahoma court has had the opportunity to consider its con-
stitutional ramifications,4 it appears that a successful first amendment challenge
to the provisions of the Act that limit contributions to ballot measure
campaigns' is inevitable. Recent United States Supreme Court decisions have
struck down very similar laws from other jurisdictions,6 ruling that no suffi-
ciently compelling state interest can justify the resulting encroachment on first
amendment liberties.' It is important for Oklahoma's legislature, then, to
1. In 1974, Congress enacted restrictions on campaign finances. Federal Election Campaign
Act, Pub. L. No. 93-444, 88 Stat. 1268 (1974), codified at 2 U.S.C. § 431 (Supp. 1982).
2. 26 OKLA. STAT. §§ 15-101 through 15-112 (1981).
3. Okla. Op. Att'y Gen. 77-193 (1977); Okla. Op. Att'y Gen. 78-188 (1978).
4. The Act was, however, the subject of an Oklahoma Law Review note in 1976. Note,
Constitutional Law: Political Campaign Regulation and the Constitution: Oklahoma's Campaign
Contributions and Expenditures Act, 29 OKLA. L. REa. 684 (1976).
5. 26 OKLA. STAT. § 15-108 (1981), which sets contribution limitations. This section should
be read in light of the definitions provided in § 15-102.
6. Firestone v. Let's Help Florida, 454 U.S. 1130 (1982), aff'g mem., Let's Help Florida
v. McCrary, 621 F.2d 195 (5th Cir. 1980); Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley,
454 U.S. 290 (1981).
7. The standard is "exacting scrutiny." See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 16 (1976),
1983]
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consider how the state's ballot measure contribution limits might fare if
challenged in the courts.
The Reaction: Oklahoma's Campaign Contributions
and Expenditures Act
The Act
The relevant section of the Campaign Contributions and Expenditures Act
of Oklahoma provides:
No person or family may contribute more than Five Thousand
Dollars ($5,000.00) to a political party or organization. No person
or family may contribute more than Five Thousand Dollars
($5,000.00) to a candidate for a state office, nor more than One
Thousand Dollars ($1,000.00) to a candidate for local office. No
political party, organization, or candidate shall receive contributions
in excess of the amounts provided herein. 8
Note that the Oklahoma legislature listed candidates and organizations
separately and placed the same monetary restrictions on each. The language
of the statute suggests that the Oklahoma legislature intended to place limits
on ballot measure contributions because support of ballot measure campaigns
is the purpose of many political "organizations." This section of the Act is
demonstrably unconstitutional in light of current Supreme Court opinions.
An earlier section of the Act defines important terms.9 A "contribution"
means "any . . . .thing of value whatsoever which is given or loaned to be
used in a campaign for or against a state question."'10 A "campaign" includes
"all activities for or against the election of a candidate or state question."",
The definition of "organization" is especially significant: "'Organization'
includes a corporation, governmental subdivision or agency, business trust,
estate, trust, partnership or association, union, political education or action
groups, and political entities with two or more persons having a joint or
common interest." 2 Thus, any gathering of Oklahomans who advocate a
particular political view is prohibited from making contributions in excess of
the statutory amount.
The Attorney General Opinions
The Attorney General of Oklahoma has twice reviewed provisions of the
Campaign Contributions and Expenditures Act.' 3 The first, a 1977 opinion,
citing Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 820 (1975); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.
254, 266 (1964), upheld in First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 786 (1978).
8. 26 OKLA. STAT. § 15-108 (1981).
9. 26 OKLA. STAT. § 15-102 (1981).
10. Id. at (3).
11. Id. at (2).
12. Id. at (5).




declared that no organization "established to wage a campaign for or against
a state question" may receive a contribution in excess of $5,000. ' The opinion
leaves open the applicability of the Act to organizations not "established"
for a political purpose, but that become active in a ballot measure campaign
subsequent to their establishment. The phrase "established to wage a
campaign" does not appear in the definition of "organization" provided by
the Act;" thus the Attorney General Opinion could arguably be limited to
those groups created for the specific purpose of campaigning. Such a reading,
however, would create a meaningless distinction between the two classifications.
The criterion should be whether the organization is presently campaigning
for a ballot measure, rather than its original purpose. Despite this ambiguity,
it is clear that the Attorney General viewed the Act as affecting ballot measure
organizations. No cases were cited in the opinion. Although written four years
before the United States Supreme Court declared ballot measure contribution
limits unconstitutional,'6 the opinion is the most thorough discussion in
Oklahoma on the subject.
A 1978 Oklahoma Attorney General Opinion concerning the Act was more
in keeping with recent contribution limitation theory.'7 Applying the Supreme
Court's decision in First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti,'8 the opinion
suggested that the section of the Oklahoma Campaign Contributions and
Expenditures Act' 9 forbidding corporations from contributing to any campaign
was an unconstitutional violation of first amendment rights.20 Most important,
the Attorney General followed Bellotti in recognizing the vital link between
campaign contributions and political speech: the privilege of a free society
to discuss matters that affect it without fear of penalty or abridgement.2 ' This
determination, which brings contributions into the realm of the first
14. Okla. Op. Att'y Gen. 77-193 (1977), which construed the references to "contributions"
in 26 OKLA. STAT. § 15-108 in light of the definition of "contribution" contained in § 15-102.
This opinion was reaffirmed in 1980. Okla. Op. Att'y Gen. 80-68 (1980). The 1980 opinion limited
the amount a corporation can contribute to a ballot measure organization.
15. 26 OKLA. STAT. § 15-102(5) (1981).
16. Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290 (1981). See also Firestone
v. Let's Help Florida, 454 U.S. 1130 (1982), aff'g mem., Let's Help Florida v. McCrary, 621
F.2d 195 (5th Cir. 1980).
17. Okla. Op. Att'y Gen. 78-188 (1978).
18. 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
19. 26 OKiA. STAT. § 15-110 (1981). This section forbids corporations from contributing to
political campaigns of any kind.
20. Okla. Op. Att'y Gen. 78-188 (1978).
21. Id., citing First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 776 (1978). Section 15-110
prohibited contributions of any amount of money to a state campaign, whether for a candidate
or a ballot measure. In deciding that the statute was unconstitutional, the Attorney General left
open the question of whether a limit may now be placed on the amount of corporate contribu-
tions, similar to the limit on individual contributions in § 15-108. The opinion also does not
distinguish between candidate campaigns and ballot measure campaigns. If the Attorney General's
opinion were followed, it seems that corporations could contribute unlimited amounts of money,
subject to no state recording or disclosure requirements, to any campaign they chose. The danger
of a corrupt "purchase" of a candidate is obvious.
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amendment, has been essential to Supreme Court decisions within the past
two years.2 Though Oklahoma's Attorney General realized that contributions
were a form of protected speech in 1978, the state has not yet applied the
concept in its courtrooms or legislative halls. While an Attorney General Opin-
ion may have persuasive influence, it is neither conclusive nor binding.23 Any
binding precedent, then, must be provided by the courts.
The Foundation of Reform: Buckley and Bellotti
The Framers designed the first amendment o the United States Constitution
to promote "uninhibited, robust, and wide open debate" on public issues."
It fosters freedom in the "marketplace of ideas,'"2 bolstering "the premise
of individual dignity and choice upon which our political system rests."' 2 The
Supreme Court has declared that political expression lies at "the very core
of the First Amendment."" It is considered the foundation of our democratic
government.2 8
Although the concept is as old as democracy itself,29 ballot measure enabling
legislation began to emerge around the country as a result of twentieth-century
populism. 30 In the early 1970s ballot measures were increasingly used as an
alternative to legislative action.31 In Oklahoma, they have served as a means
of gauging public mores on such issues as liquor by the drink and parimutuel
betting. It is certain that ballot measures will "increase in number and
importance in the years ahead.1 2
As popular interest in ballot measures increases, so will questions regarding
the validity of restrictions on their use. Do monetary contributions to a ballot
measure campaign constitute political "speech," thus falling within first amend-
ment protection, or are they political "conduct," which may be more closely
22. Firestone v. Let's Help Florida, 454 U.S. 1130 (1982), aff'g mem., Let's Help Florida
v. McCrary, 621 F.2d 195 (5th Cir. 1980); Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley,
454 U.S. 290 (1981).
23. Goodin v. Board of Educ., 601 P.2d 88, 91 (Okla. 1979).
24. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
25. Cox, The Supreme Court, 1979 Term-Foreword: Freedom of Expression in the Burger
Court, 94 HARv. L. REv. 1, 2 (1980).
26. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24 (1971).
27. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 39 (1976), quoting Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 32
(1968). See First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 777 (1978); Pickering v. Board
of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 573 (1968); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74 (1964).
28. See BeVier, The First Amendment and Political Speech: An Inquiry into the Substance
of Limits of Principle, 30 STAN. L. REv. 299 (1978); Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an
Absolute, 1961 Sup. Cr. REV. 245. In Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964), the Court
said: "For speech concerning public affairs is more than self-expression, it is the essence of
self-government." Id. at 74-75.








regulated?33 What governmental interests may be advanced to support
campaign contribution limitations, and what level of scrutiny should the
Supreme Court use in examining them? Two cases within the last decade,
Buckley v. Valeo 3  and First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti,"1 have laid
the modern framework for answers to these questions.
Buckley v. Valeo
Although it dealt exclusively with candidate (as opposed to ballot measure)
campaigns, Buckley is the watershed case on contribution limitations.36 The
Court borrowed dicta from Buckley to justify later decisions on ballot measure
issues. In Buckley the Court scrutinized important provisions of the 1974
amendments to the Federal Election Campaign Act of 197131 and held per
curiam that contribution limitations and disclosure requirements in candidate
campaigns are constitutional.38 However, the Court ruled that limits on the
independent expenditures of candidates violated free speech guarantees.39
The Court initially recognized that the first amendment provides broad
protection to political speech and political association in order to protect the
"unfettered exchange of ideas" which is "integral to the operation of the
system of government established by our Constitution."' Further, the Court
reasoned that because "virtually every means of communicating ideas in today's
mass society requires the expenditure of money,"" political expenditures fall
within the first amendment protection of speech: "a restriction on [campaign
expenditures] ... necessarily reduces the quantity of expression by restricting
the number of issues discussed, the depth of their exploration, and the size
of the audience reached."' This characterization of campaign expenditures
33. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968). The Court in O'Brien rejected a draft-
card burner's claim that his activity was protected by the first amendment.
34. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
35. 435 U.S. 765 (1978). See generally, Note, State and Local Limitations on Ballot Measure
Contributions, 79 MICH. L. REv. 1421 (1981).
36. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). The case has generated extensive commentary. See,
e.g., Clagett & Bolten, Buckley v. Valeo, Its Aftermath, and Its Prospects: The Constitutionality
of Government Restraints on Political Campaign Financing, 29 VAD. L. REV. 1327 (1976);
Nicholson, Buckley v. Valeo: The Constitutionality of the Federal Election Campaign Act Amend-
ments of 1974, 1977 Wis. L. REV. 323; Polsby, Buckley v. Valeo: The Special Nature of Political
Speech, 1976 Sup. CT. REV. 1; Comment, Buckley v. Valeo: The Supreme Court and Federal
Campaign Reform, 76 COLUT. L. REV. 852 (1976).
37. Pub. L. No. 93-444, 88 Stat. 1268, 1269 (1974), codified at 2 U.S.C. § 431 (Supp. 1982).
The amendments, together with the original FECA, limited contributions to candidates for federal
office from an individual or group to $1,000. Restrictions were also placed on the amount a
candidate could spend. The Act contained a detailed disclosure and reporting plan.
38. 424 U.S. 1, 23-38, 60-84 (1976).
39. Id. at 39-59.
40. Id. at 14.
41. Id. at 19.
42. Id. As the Court put it: "Being free to engage in unlimited political expression subject
to a ceiling on expenditures is like being free to drive an automobile as far and as often as
one desires on a single tank of gas." Id. at 19 n.18.
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as speech rather than conduct justified a higher standard of scrutiny"' and
was essential to later determination of ballot measure issues.
The standard invoked was strict scrutiny,"" the most exacting tier in judicial
analysis. First amendment restrictions must meet two tests in order to survive
strict scrutiny: first, a compelling governmental interest must justify the
restriction, and, second, the restriction must be narrowly drawn in order to
prevent unnecessary infringement.4
In applying this test, the Buckley Court distinguished between contribu-
tions to a candidate's campaign and individual expenditures by or on behalf
of a candidate. Even under strict scrutiny, contribution limitations were
justified by the compelling governmental interest of preventing corruption.46
The Court found no state interest sufficient to justify individual expenditure
limitations.4 The danger of corruption in expenditures was deemed to be
remote at best because independent advocacy involves less danger of a quid
pro quo arrangement due to lack of coordination with the candidate's organiza-
tion. The chance of corruption is much greater when contributions are made
to the political fund of a candidate. Although an illicit bargain may result
in an individual expenditure for a candidate outside of his central organization,
the Court did not perceive this danger as significant enough to justify curtailing
independent advocacy.
4
It is important that the Court rejected the asserted state interest in equalizing
the ability of candidates or supporters to influence the outcome of an election. 9
It declared that "the First Amendment denies government the power to
determine that spending to promote one's political views is wasteful, excessive,
or unwise.' ' 0 It asserted that the people, not the government, must control
political debate in a free society."
First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti
In 1977, two years after Buckley, the Supreme Court reached the next stage
in the development of its political contribution theory. 2 The Bellotti case
43. The speech/conduct distinction originated in Justice Douglas's concurring opinion on
Teamsters Local 802 v. Wohl, 315 U.S. 769, 776-77 (1942). The distinction has been widely
criticized but the Supreme Court is apparently unwilling to abandon it. See generally L. TIBE,
AmERICAN CoNs-rrrtoNA. LAW 598-601 (1978). For a criticism of the Court's characterization
of campaign expenditures as speech, see Wright, Politics and the Constitution, 85 YALE L.J.
1001, 1005-21 (1976).
44. Buckley, 424 U.S. 25, 44-45 (1976).
45. Id. at 25.
46. Id. at 26-27.
47. Id. at 45.
48. Id. at 45-47. The Court's analysis ignores the fact that individuals could make a corrupt
agreement with a candidate to spend money on his behalf.
49. Id. at 48-49.
50. Id. at 57.
51. Id. See supra text accompanying notes 63-70.
52. First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978). In Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S.
347 (1976), the Court, citing Buckley, declared that a mere showing of a "legitimate" state interest
was insufficient to justify first amendment abridgement: "The interest advanced must be para-
[Vol. 36
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol36/iss3/7
involved a Massachusetts tatute3 that prohibited corporations from making
contributions to ballot measure campaigns.5 4 Supporters of the law contended
that corporate contributions would unduly influence the outcome of ballot
measures and "destroy the confidence of the people in the democratic processes
and the integrity of government."" The Court flatly rejected this argument,
stating that "the concept that government may restrict the speech of some
elements of our society in order to enhance the relative voice of others is
wholly foreign to the First Amendment."" Advocacy may not be suppressed
simply because it affects the outcome of an election, the Court asserted, for
"the Constitution 'protects expression which is eloquent no less than that which
is unconvincing."'57
According to the Bellotti Court, the only sufficiently compelling state interest
was the prevention of corruption." The Court then made a key distinction
between candidate and ballot measure campaigns, stating: "The risk of
corruption perceived in cases involving candidate elections . .. simply is not
present in a popular vote on a public issue."5 9 It is not difficult to understand
why the Court reached this conclusion. In ballot measure campaigns, there
is no danger of "purchasing" a candidate who will vote favorably on proposed
legislation. Once the tally of ballot measure votes is complete, contributions
to the campaign cease to have significance. The measure either passes or it
fails. The effect of contributions on a ballot measure is success or failure
at the polls, not a corrupt quid pro quo bargain whose fulfillment must wait
for a future decision. For lack of a compelling state interest, therefore, the
Massachusetts statute was invalidated."
Justice White, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, dissented on the
ground that the Court had not properly balanced the first amendment con-
siderations and the state interest in preventing strong corporate influence on
the political process.6' Such a balancing approach is foreign to the exacting
scrutiny tests employed by the Court in the past when viewing first amendment
infringements. The dissent did not contend that the interest was compelling,
nor did it assert that the statute was narrowly drawn to prevent unnecessary
mount, one of vital importance, and the burden is upon the government to show the existence
of such an interest." Id. at 362. Although Elrod is a plurality opinion, even the dissenting Justices
agreed on the strict scrutiny standard. Id. at 381 (Powell, J., dissenting, joined by Burger, C.J.,
and Rehnquist, J.).
53. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 55 § 8 (Michie/Law. Coop. 1978).
54. 435 U.S. 765 (1978). Oklahoma has a similar statute forbidding all corporate contribu-
tions. See supra note 19. It was viewed as unconstitutional by Oklahoma's Attorney General.
Okla. Op. Att'y Gen. 78-188 (1978).
55. 435 U.S. 765, 790-91 (1978).
56. Id., quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1976).
57. Id., quoting Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents, 360 U.S. 684, 689 (1959).
58. Id. at 789-91. This is the same interest asserted in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 46
(1976). See also Common Cause v. Harrison Schmitt, 512 F. Supp. 489, 494-95 (D.D.C. 1980).
59. First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 790 (1978).
60. Id. at 795.
61. Id. at 804-06.
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speech curtailment. At any rate, the majority found "no showing that the
relative voice of corporations has been overwhelming or even significant in
influencing referenda in Massachusetts."6
Paternalism Renounced
Central to both Buckley and Bellotti is the concern that large contributors
can dominate the political process. Because the power of mass media is
available only to the wealthy, several commentators have feared "gross
inequalities in the meaning of a vote.'6 3 Theoretically, the "marketplace of
ideas" concept is only effective when "all people are equally able to par-
ticipate in making or influencing the choice."'4 This "equalizing of voices"
principle has received the attention of some constitutional scholars.5
The Supreme Court, however, explicitly rejected this approach in both
Buckley" and Bellotti.7 The Court has never permitted an attempt to equalize
political expression by restricting the relative influence of some," but it has
always held that unrestricted speech is essential to self-government, a core
value of the first amendment.'9 Ballot measures, in particular, require "the
widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic
forces.""°
There is another frailty in the application of an equalization argument to
ballot measure contributions. Limitations cannot affect direct expenditures
by individuals because they are protected under Buckley." Buckley only permits
the limitation of contributions to a political action group." Thus, the wealthy
may continue to use the mass media to communicate, while ordinary citizens
62. Id. at 789.
63. Adamany, PAC's and the Democratic Financing of Politics, 22 ARiz. L. REV. 569, 571
(1980). See Mastro, Costlow & Sanchez, Taking the Initiative: Corporate Control of the Referendum
Process Through Media Spending and What To Do About It, 32 FED. COMMUNICATIONS B.J.
315, 319-20 (1980).
64. T. EUmRSON, THIE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 629 (1970).
65. See Leventhal, Courts and Political Thickets, 77 CoitM. L. REv. 345, 368-75 (1977) (equal
protection and first amendment analysis); Nicholson, Campaign Financing and Equal Protec-
tion, 26 STAN. L. REV. 815, 821-42 (1974) (equal protection analysis); Wright, Politics and the
Constitution: Is Money Speech?, 85 YALE L.J. 1001, 1017-21 (1976) (equal access of ideas to
the marketplace).
66. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1976).
67. First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 790-91 (1978).
68. See, e.g., Miami Herald Pub. Co. v. Tornillo, 421 U.S. 241 (1974), which invalidated
a statute requiring newspapers to provide space at no cost for candidates to reply to critical
editorials. But see Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390-91 (1969) (no constitu-
tional barrier to FCC regulation requiring radio and television broadcasters to set aside airtime
for reply to personal attacks and political editorials). Red Lion has been limited to its facts.
First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 791 n.30 (1978).
69. First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 776-77 (1978) and cases cited therein.
70. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 790 n.29, quoting New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266
(1964) and Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945).
71. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48-51 (1976).
72. The Oklahoma statute limits the amount a person or a family may contribute "to a political
party or organization." There is no limitation on individual expenditures for or against a ballot




are restricted in their ability to join in groups to express themselves. Such
an "equalization" plan, therefore, has a reverse effect. It works to the
detriment of those of modest means who were intended to be assisted by the
plan. Two recent cases, Let's Help Florida v. McCrary"' and Citizens Against
Rent Control v. City of Berkeley (CARC),7" expose the constitutional
difficulties with the imposition of contribution limitations on ballot measure
campaigns.
Current Solutions: The Let's Help Florida and CARC Cases
Let's Help Florida v. McCrary
Let's Help Florida v. McCrary" was one of the first federal cases to consider
limitations on ballot measure contributions.76 The Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit held that a Florida election code remarkably similar to
Oklahoma's impermissibly infringed on first amendment rights.7 The Florida
statute prohibited individual contributions in excess of $3,000 "to any political
committee in support of, or in opposition to, an issue voted on in a statewide
election."' 78 This is clearly comparable to Oklahoma's $5,000 limit on
contributions to a "political party or organization."
7 9
Let's Help Florida was a political committee organized to campaign for
the passage of a ballot measure to legalize casino gambling in southern
Florida. 0 Arguing that their group effort could not continue unless the state
contribution limitations were lifted, Let's Help Florida sought declaratory and
injunctive relief against the Florida Secretary of State. Upon a finding of
unconstitutionality, the district court granted the request.8
A comparison between Florida and Oklahoma election laws is illuminating.
In Florida, a "political committee" means, among other things, "a combina-
tion of two or more individuals, the purpose of which is to support or oppose
any issue."82 In Oklahoma, a political "organization" may mean "political
entities with two or more persons having a joint or common interest."' 83 Florida
73. 621 F.2d 195 (5th Cir. 1980), aff'd mem., sub nom. Firestone v. Let's Help Florida,
454 U.S. 1130 (1982).
74. 454 U.S. 290 (1981). See generally Nicholson, The Constitutionality of Contribution
Limitations in Ballot-Measure Elections, 9 ECOLOGY L.Q. 683 (1981).
75. 621 F.2d 195 (5th Cir. 1980), aff'd mem., sub nom. Firestone v. Let's Help Florida,
454 U.S. 1130 (1982).
76. C & C Plywood Corp. v. Hanson, 583 F.2d 421 (9th Cir. 1978) struck down a Montana
statute prohibiting corporate contributions for ballot measures.
77. Let's Help Florida v. McCrary, 621 F.2d 195 (5th Cir. 1980), aff'd mem., sub nom.,
Firestone v. Let's Help Florida, 454 U.S. 1130 (1982).
78. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 106.08(1)(d) (West 1982).
79. 26 OKLA. STAT. § 15-108 (1981).
80. The organization is comparable to recent Oklahoma groups organized to urge passage
of, for example, parimutuel betting.
81. Let's Help Florida v. Smathers, 453 F. Supp. 1003, 1014 (N.D. Fla. 1978), aff'd sub
nom. Let's Help Florida v. McCrary, 621 F.2d 195 (5th Cir. 1980).
82. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 106.011(1) (West 1982).
83. 26 OKLA. STAT. § 15-102(5) (1981).
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requires less information about a donor when the contribution is less than
$100.84 The same is true in Oklahoma for contributions less than $200." Florida
requires the approval of a political candidate before an expenditure can be
made in his name,86 as does Oklahoma." Neither state limits the amount of
expenditures that may be made by a candidate. Though not all of these
similarities are particularly relevant to ballot measures, they do indicate that
the election codes of these states were modeled after the same pattern. The
federal court's ruling on Florida's contribution limitations, therefore, should
be persuasive authority for Oklahoma.
Recognizing that the constitutional issue presented by Let's Help Florida
was one of first impression,88 the district court made four initial observations
regarding the first amendment:
1. The First Amendment occupies a preferred position among the
guarantees of the Constitution.
2. Governmental activity having the effect of curtailing First
Amendment freedoms is subject to strict judicial scrutiny.
3. Intrusions on the First Amendment are permitted only when
the state demonstrates a sufficiently compelling interest in regulation
and the means employed to promote the interest are closely drawn
to avoid unnecessary interference with protected freedoms.
4. First Amendment freedoms need breathing space to survive. 9
United States Supreme Court cases were cited as authority for each proposi-
tion.90
The court recognized that the Florida statute did not prohibit or limit the
content of political speech, and only indirectly limited the quantity of such
speech.91 Nevertheless, the statute constituted a substantial interference with
first amendment freedoms. Such an infringement, under strict scrutiny, can
only be justified by a compelling governmental interest. The court recognized
that the prevention of corruption was the only possible state interest that could
be so described.92 But the court properly distinguished Buckley, which dealt
solely with candidate campaigns, by declaring that there can be no threat of
corruption in ballot measure campaigns.3 Because the government interest
was not sufficiently compelling, the court ruled the statutory first amend-
84. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 106.07(4)(a) (West 1982).
85. 26 OKLA. STAT. § 15-103(1) (1981).
86. FLA. STAT. ANN . § 106.011(5) (West 1982).
87. 26 OKtA. STAT. § 15-105(d) (1982).
88. Let's Help Florida v. Smathers, 453 F. Supp. 1003, 1009 (N.D. Fla. 1978), aff'd sub
nom. Let's Help Florida v. McCrary, 621 F.2d 195 (5th Cir. 1980).
89. Id.
90. Id. For the first proposition, the court cited: Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946);
for the second proposition: NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958); for the third proposition:
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976); and for the fourth proposition: NAACP v. Button, 371
U.S. 415 (1963).
91. 453 F. Supp. 1003, 1008 (N.D. Fla. 1978).





ment infringement unconstitutional. The state of Florida was permanently
enjoined from enforcing it against the plaintiff in the context of a ballot
measure election.
94
The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision, consolidating Let's
Help Florida with Dade Voters for a Free Choice v. Firestone." As a further
explanation of the candidate/ballot measure distinction, the court stated:
The state's interest in preventing the actual or apparent corruption
of candidates, which the Supreme Court found so compelling in
Buckley, does not justify restrictions upon political contributions
in referendum elections. When people elect a candidate, they choose
someone to whom they can delegate their political decision making.
The people's need to prevent large contributors from improperly
influencing this representative decision maker is critical. In contrast,
when people vote on a referendum proposal, they directly decide
the pertinent political issue for themselves. Large contributions for
publicity by one group or another do not influence the political
decisionmakers-in this case, the voters themselves-except in a
manner protected by the first amendment.
96
The appellate court also referred to Bellotti7 to support the proposition that
the expression of some should not be diminished by government in order to
uplift the relative influence of others.9 8
Rejecting a state argument that restrictions on the size of contributions are
necessary to promote adequate disclosure about campaign financing, the court
found that "these statutes that restrict the amount a person may contribute
to a single committee do little to promote disclosure."9 The court explained:
The primary effect of the statutes is to compel large contributors
who support or oppose a referendum issue to form multiple partisan
committees, each of which can receive the maximum amount from
a single contributor under the statute. These multiple partisan
committees provide no additional disclosure; the public still sees
only the innocuous names of the different committees, and not
the identities of the underlying contributors.'0
Interestingly enough, the Oklahoma statutes contain precisely the same legal
loophole.'0 ' If a state law can be circumvented this easily, then it is without
value regardless of its purpose.
94. Id. at 1014.
95. 621 F.2d 195 (5th Cir. 1980).
96. Let's Help Florida v. McCrary, 621 F.2d 195, 199-200 (1980), aff'g Let's Help Florida
v. Smathers, 453 F. Supp. 1003 (N.D. Fla. 1978).
97. See supra text accompanying note 56.
98. 621 F.2d 195, 200 (5th Cir. 1980).
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Note, Constitutional Law: Political Campaign Regulation and the Constitution: Oklahoma's
Campaign Contributions and Expenditures Act, 29 OKoA. L. R v. 684, 695 (1976).
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Let's Help Florida was appealed to the Supreme Court and was affirmed
in a memorandum decision on January 11, 1982.102 The case had been cited
with approval in CARC,'0 3 decided less than one month earlier, for the pro-
position that Buckley' " does not support ballot measure contribution
limitations.""1 An examination of CARC, the most recent Supreme Court
opinion, and a comparison with Buckley highlight the evolution of the Court's
thought during the last five years.
Citizens Against Rent Control/Coalition for Fair
Housing v. City of Berkeley
The Opinion ,
In CARC the Supreme Court reversed a 1980 California Supreme Court
decision permitting ballot measure contribution limitations."6 A Berkeley city
ordinance had placed a restriction on the amount that could be contributed
to any committee that supported or opposed a ballot measure. In declaring
the ordinance to be unconstitutional, the Court made several vital first amend-
ment conclusions. Only Justice White dissented to the judgment."7
Chief Justice Burger, writing for the majority, observed initially that the
Berkeley ordinance did not limit the amount an affluent person could spend,
acting alone, to express his views. "It is only when contributions are made
in concert with one or more others in the exercise of the right of association
that they are restricted . . . .'"" The ordinance, then, constituted a signifi-
cant infringement on the first amendment freedoms of association and
speech."9
Such infringements, Justice Burger stated, have always been subjected to
exacting judicial scrutiny."0 The opinion noted that Buckley permitted a
"single, narrow exception" to the general rule that limits on political expression
are unconstitutional: limits on contributions are justified by "the perception
of undue influence of large contributors to a candidate.""' Because this danger
is not present in ballot measures, no legitimate state interest remained to justify
102. Firestone v. Let's Help Florida, 454 U.S. 1130 (1982), aff'g Let's Help Florida v. McCrary,
621 F.2d 195 (5th Cir. 1980).
103. Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290 (1981).
104. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
105. Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 297 (1981).
106. 26 Cal. 3d 819, 614 P.2d 742, 167 Cal. Rptr. 84 (1980).
107. 454 U.S. 290, 303 (1931). Justice White also dissented in Buckley and Bellotti, the two
cases used as principal authority in CARC.
108. Id. at 296. The same statement may be made regarding 26 OKLA. STAT. § 15-108 (1981)
because it only limits contributions to political organizations. An individual acting on his own
may spend as much as he desires.
109. Id. at 299.
110. Id. at 294, 298. Note that Justices Blackmun and O'Connor concurred in the standard
of review. Id. at 302.




"curtailing debate."1"2 Disclosure requirements were sufficient to protect the
city of Berkeley's asserted desire to preserve the integrity of the political
system."I3
Thus, CARC significantly weakened the "equalization" rationale. The
majority asserted that "Buckley. . .made clear that contributors cannot be
protected from the possibility that others will make larger contributions.""'
The concept of a free marketplace of ideas emerged triumphant despite the
objection of three members of the Court. Although concurring in the judgment,
Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and O'Connor asserted that, with satisfactory
evidence, the goal of preserving the integrity of the democratic process may
be sufficient to justify contribution limitations.' '1 Five Justices in the majority
summarily rejected this concept, declaring that the purpose of the first amend-
ment is to "secure the widest possible dissemination of information from
diverse and antagonistic forces." "16 The Court's upholding of "the unfettered
exchange of ideas" struck a blow against those who would "restrict the speech
of some elements of society in order to enhance the relative voice of others.""' '
The Evolution: From Buckley to CARC
A careful reading of Buckley and CARC reveals two important changes
in contribution limitation philosophy. First, the majority opinion of CARC
completely ignored, thus impliedly rejected, the expenditure/contribution
distinction so important in Buckley. Buckley had viewed independent expen-
ditures as involving somewhat more important first amendment interests than
contributions."I8 Justices Marshall and White cited a recent plurality opinion
involving a candidate campaign as support for their view." 9 The majority,
by its silence, indicated that the distinction, if valid at all, has no place in
ballot measure considerations.'
A second change was CARC's increased awareness of the role of contribu-
tions as a means of political expression. Buckley regarded contribution
112. Id. at 297. Chief Justice Burger cited two lower court opinions for this proposition: Let's
Help Florida v. McCrary, 621 F.2d 195, 199 (5th Cir. 1980); C & C Plywood Corp. v. Hanson,
583 F.2d 421, 425 (9th Cir. 1978).
113. Id. at 298-99.
114. Id. at 295.
115. 454 U.S. at 301 (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment); 454 U.S. at 301 (Blackmun,
J., and O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
116. 454 U.S. at 295-96, quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266, 269 (1964).
117. CARC, 454 U.S. at 295, quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 15 (1976).
118. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 22-23, 48 (1976).
119. CARC, 454 U.S. 290, 301, 305 (1981). The Justices cited California Medical Association
v. Federal Election Comm'n, 453 U.S. 182 (1981) (upholding federal limitations upon contribu-
tions to multicandidate political committees).
120. It should be noted, however, that Chief Justice Burger, who wrote the CARC majority
opinion, dissented to the contribution/expenditures distinction in Buckley. He stated that: "For
me contributions and expenditures are two sides of the same First Amendment coin." Buckley
v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 241 (1976) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
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limitations as a "marginal restriction upon the contributor's ability to engage
in free communication," because a contribution was merely an "undifferen-
tiated, symbolic act."'' By contrast, CARC ruled that contributions were
a very significant form of political expression."2 2 This metamorphosis of
attitude may also be traced to the difference between candidates' campaign
and ballot measures. Unlike candidate contributors, supporters of ballot
measures strive for advocacy of a particular issue. Their efforts may not be
reduced to the category of symbolic gestures because they are real attempts
to speak politically with others of like mind. Thus, the transition of the Court's
values must stem from its recognition of the distinction between candidate
and ballot measures. Ballot measure donations are political speech and as
such are protected from limitation by the state.
Conclusion
The Oklahoma state legislature should acknowledge the Supreme Court's
determination and amend the campaign contribution statute to remove all
restrictions on contributions to ballot measure committees. Specifically, sec-
tion 15-108 of Title 26 of the Oklahoma Statutes should be repealed. In its
place, a new section may be written that places a reasonable restriction on
contributions to a political candidate or his organization, a provision permitted
under Buckley as an anticorruption device. Such changes would ensure that
the fundamental rights inherent in ballot measure campaigns would be
preserved.
At present, Oklahoma enshrouds freedom of speech and association within
a poorly written, valueless state statute. Though the code may reduce the
possibility of corruption, it sacrifices first amendment liberties in the process.
If Oklahoma's legislature fails to implement reforms, the law should be for-
mally called into question by a ballot measure organization. The CARC and
Let's Help Florida decisions provide a predictable outcome to the action.
Addendum
On August 17, 1983, while this note was being prepared for publication,
the Attorney General of Oklahoma issued an opinion directly addressing the
issues presented herein. '2 The opinion used the CARC case as its principal
authority and found the language of Let's Help Florida persuasive. The At-
torney General concluded that Oklahoma's Campaign Contributions and Ex-
penditures Act "as previously interpreted by this office would place an im-
permissible limitation on First Amendment rights .... 1"'2
The Attorney General therefore offered the following official opinion: "The
provisions of the Oklahoma Campaign Contributions and Expenditures Act,
26 O.S. 1981, § 15-101 et seq., may not be read so as to place a limit on
121. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 20-21.
122. CARC, 454 U.S. 290, 296 (1981).
123. Okla. Op. Att'y Gen. 83-138 (1983).
124. Id.
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